Prompting legislative agreement and loyalty: what role for intra-party democracy? by Close, Caroline et al.
Close, C., Gherghina, S.  and Sierens, V. (2018) Prompting legislative 
agreement and loyalty: what role for intra-party democracy? 
Parliamentary Affairs,  72(2), pp. 387-405. (doi:10.1093/pa/gsx075) 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/157929/ 
Deposited on: 26 February 2018 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
1 
Prompting Legislative Agreement and Loyalty: What Role for Intra-Party Democracy? 
 
Caroline Close (Department of Political Science, Universite Libre de Bruxelles) 
Sergiu Gherghina (Department of Politics, University of Glasgow) 
Vivien Siriens (Department of Political Science, Universite Libre de Bruxelles) 
 
Abstract 
Existing research often suggests that a greater degree of internal democracy within parties 
could weaken party unity. This article tests this assumption and analyses the relationship 
between degrees of intra-party democracy (IPD) and legislators’ attitudes towards party unity. 
The article uses data collected in the framework of the PartiRep Comparative MP Survey; and of 
the Political Party Database (PPDB). The study includes 796 parliamentarians in 45 parties, 
elected in 14 European national assemblies. The findings indicate that the legislators from more 
democratic party organizations tend to report more frequent disagreement and to assert their 
own opinions against the one of their parties. 
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Introduction 
Party unity is a crucial aspect of parliamentary systems that varies across time, parties and 
countries. Scholars have investigated what shapes this degree of unity at different levels of the 
polity (Bowler et al. 1999; Depauw & Martin 2009; Kam 2009; Sieberer 2006; van Vonno et al. 
2014) with particular attention being dedicated to the ‘party in public office', as one of 
prominent faces of the party (Katz and Mair, 1993). Research focusing on party-level factors 
revealed the impact of party size, government status, parliamentary party groups’ norms and 
rules of functioning, the role of committee organization and of division of labour, and candidate 
selection rules on party unity (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011; Depauw 2003; Hazan & Rahat 
2006; Patzelt 2003). These findings indicate that general aspects of party organization may 
influence the behaviour of legislators. In particular, one of the strongest predictors can be the 
level of intra-party democracy (IPD). Earlier research referred to its explanatory potential and 
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conceptualized it mostly as inclusive or decentralized candidate selection procedures. However, 
although previous studies indicate that IPD means much more than candidate selection (Cross 
and Katz, 2013; Rahat and Shapira, 2017), little attention has been paid to revealing how IPD in 
its complex form may shape legislative behaviour.  
This article seeks to address this gap in the literature and investigates the extent to 
which IPD influences party unity, measured as disagreement and loyalty between 
parliamentarians and their parties. In doing so, the analysis uses two comparative datasets on 
party organization and legislative behaviour: one to build a comprehensive index of IPD with 
data collected in the framework of the Political Party Database (PPDB) project (Scarrow et al. 
2017) and another to capture MPs’ self-reported frequency of (dis)agreement and loyalty 
through data collected in the frame of the PartiRep Comparative MP Survey (Deschouwer & 
Depauw 2014). The analysis includes 796 parliamentarians in 45 parties, elected in 14 European 
national assemblies. Our central argument is that IPD increases the number of principals, which 
can have diverging preferences and interests. Consequently, legislators belonging to more 
democratic parties may thus be more likely to face and report disagreement. Moreover, IPD 
may cultivate a candidate-centred approach in which the inclusiveness of people in deciding 
who the next legislator will be is likely to result in lower loyalty towards the party.   
We bring two contributions to the literature. First, we propose a complex theoretical 
model that could link IPD to party unity beyond the single issue of candidate selection. This 
model is not contextual or country specific and thus can be used by further research. Second, 
we assess the degree of party unity independently from voting behaviour and disciplinary 
effects and we use attitudinal data, i.e. what the MPs think rather than what they do.  In doing 
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so, we challenge the ‘black box’ of parliamentary parties and examine what usually remains 
hidden. We differentiate between two dimensions: party agreement, which is defined as ‘the 
extent to which co-partisans agree with one another’ (van Vonno et al. 2014); and party loyalty, 
which derives from the legislators’ internalization of the norms of party unity and solidarity.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The first section reviews the 
relevant literature and formulates two expectations about the effects of IPD on legislative 
agreement and loyalty. Next, we describe the data and method used. The third section presents 
and interprets the main findings, while the conclusions reflect on the broader implications of 
this study.  
 
IPD and legislative agreement and loyalty 
We conceive intra-party democracy as a complex concept that includes the degree of 
inclusiveness of party personnel (candidate and leader) selection and organizational structure. 
Our central argument posits that IPD decreases the likelihood of parliamentarians’ agreement 
and loyalty towards their party. More specifically, we expect these attitudes to be shaped by the 
inclusiveness and decentralization of how they and the party leaders are selected and by a more 
democratic party organization that promotes a participatory culture. We build on findings from 
earlier research that revealed how legislators who can establish ties with voters and local 
constituencies are able to display individualistic behaviour in parliament (Tavits, 2009).  
Within the legislative field, scholars have intensely investigated the impact of candidate 
selection rules on parliamentary party unity (Hix 2004; Depauw & Martin 2009; Rombi & 
Seddone 2017; Sieberer 2006). Candidate selection works both as an individualizing (from MPs’ 
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perspective) and as a disciplinary tool (from parties’ perspective). More inclusive and 
decentralized selectorates would increase intra-party competition for (re)nomination and as a 
consequence would pressure candidates to distinguish themselves from co-partisans and to 
cultivate their personal reputation instead of their party’s reputation (Carey & Shugart 1995; 
Hazan & Rahat 2015; Sieberer 2006). By contrast, where the re-selection of MPs is more 
dependent on the choice of a smaller agency or a more exclusive committee, often composed 
by the main party leaders, MPs would adopt more party-centred behaviours (Gherghina, 2014). 
When selection is controlled by the leadership, sticking to the party line would constitute a 
rewarding strategy for MPs seeking re-selection; the party leadership nominating more ‘loyal’ 
individuals (Sieberer 2006). More centralized procedures can also be used as ‘whipping 
resources’ (Ceron 2014; 2015) by the party leader to enforce compliance with the party’s 
decisions. Centralized candidate selection produces more party-delegates than decentralized 
procedures (Esaiasson 2000; Önnudóttir 2016; Strøm 2012). In case of conflict between their 
voters’ or their own position and that of their party, the MPs selected through centralized 
process would be more likely to state that they should follow their party’s position, what in turn 
often translates into voting unity. By contrast, more decentralized candidate selection processes 
may result in elected representatives feeling caught between being accountable to their 
localities or to their party, sometimes resulting in MPs defending local positions instead of the 
central party’s position when the interests of their constituency is threatened by the party’s 
policy position.   
Another rationale behind this relationship states that more inclusive or decentralized 
candidate selection methods would expand the diversity of interests and preferences that are 
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expressed during intra-party decision-making processes (Hazan & Rahat 2015), and increase the 
risk of conflict between the principals (Carey 2007) to which (elected) candidates need to be 
accountable. MPs selected through inclusive processes show responsiveness to the preferences 
and interests of their selectorates (delegates, members or supporters). The latter might have 
quite disperse and heterogeneous positions that could diverge from those of the party leader 
and voters (May 1973; van Holsteyn & Andeweg 2010). Consequently, a tension may arise for 
individual representatives between being accountable to their party members or supporters, 
who decide MPs’ re-selection and have more radical views, and that of the party (leader), and 
whose preferences are closer to those of the median voter (Gauja, 2005).  
The inclusiveness and decentralization of leadership selection may influence in two ways 
the legislative behaviour. First, when leaders are selected by a broader array of party units 
within the organization or by many party members, the support of party factions gains 
relevance (Boucek, 2012, pp. 133–142). MPs belong to different factions in the party and 
whenever their behaviour against the party line is questioned by the party, the likelihood of 
punitive actions is lower due to their importance in electing the president. At the same time, 
since the leadership selection could be a function of faction support, the MPs belonging to 
factions opposing the new leader may be unhappy with the party’s policy directions and thus go 
against it in parliament (e.g. The case of some Labour MPs and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK)(Bucur, 
2017). Second the involvement of more members in the leadership selection process conveys a 
message of openness to more voices within the party. This openness could be also taken to the 
legislative arena where MPs belonging to the same party may perceive as welcome their 
diverging opinions.  
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Contemporary political parties are characterized by the idea that power is not located in 
a single place (Carty, 2004). This model of stratarchical organization entails the existence of a 
few units enjoying various degrees of autonomy but also interdependence in their particular 
activities. For example, local units focus on voter mobilisation and member recruitment, while 
the central units pursue the general integration of the organization and formulate the party 
policy. In this sense, the central units set the rules according to which the local branches 
undertake their activities (Carty, 2004). At their turn, local branches are rewarded for their 
activity and allowed involvement in the intra-party decision-making process on a variety of 
issues (Gherghina, 2014). This involvement of the local branches creates possibilities for the 
legislators to move away from party (in central office) control and develop a personal network 
of supporters that can foster an individualistic behaviour in parliament. The logical mechanism 
can be summarized as follows. The essence of parliamentarians’ work is the representation of 
their constituency. In this process many become popular among their constituents, they are 
familiar with voters’ needs and policy priorities, while some may have some local roots or local 
level political experience (Tavits, 2009). A strong localism has two immediate effects: one is that 
the MPs demonstrate their willingness to respond to problems raised by citizens, send a 
message of better representation for citizens and thus hope to increase their chances for re-
election (Gherghina, 2014); another is the development of an independent profile in which the 
legislators gain recognition and popularity outside the brand of the party, they cultivate 
personal contacts and reach out to the electorate and implicitly local party members through 
other means that the party based.  
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Consequently, when local organizations or party members receive an important say in 
intra-party decisions, the MPs’ room for leverage increases. When their behaviour in the 
legislature goes against the party line, the likelihood to be punished is more limited when they 
are backed by loyal local organizations and members. Let us take an example that illustrates 
how this may work in practice. A political party in which the highest executive body (e.g. the 
executive committee or the national executive, depending on the party) includes several high 
level officials does not allow for external input about an MP and the legislator’s behaviour in 
parliament is scrutinized only by them. In this case, defection from the party line is likely to be 
punished. By contrast, a party that allows access to more members and gives them voting rights 
in the highest executive party will open the floor to more opinions and to input from lower 
levels where legislators have popularity. In this case, the likelihood of punishment is smaller.   
Overall, the literature suggests that greater IPD would result in lower parliamentary 
party unity, whatever the dimensions observed (homogeneity of preferences, voting loyalty, 
attitudes towards representation etc.). In line with these arguments, we expect IPD to increase 
legislators’ reported frequency of disagreement (H1) and to decrease the legislators’ loyalty 
(H2).  
 
Control variables 
In addition to these main effects, we control for several variables at individual and party level. 
Individual-level control variables include socio-demographic characteristics (age and gender), 
MPs’ previous parliamentary experience (seniority) and MPs’ perceived ideological distance 
with their party as earlier research showed how they matter (Close & Núñez, 2017; Cowley & 
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Childs, 2003; Gherghina & Chiru, 2014; Kam, 2009). In addition, we control for the way each 
legislator has been elected: party-centred (PR closed or flexible list), intermediate (majoritarian 
or plurality single-member district), or candidate-centred (PR open list) or system (Mitchell, 
2000). The greater the candidate-centeredness of the system, the greater the incentives for 
individual legislators to cultivate a personal rather than a party vote, and thus to deviate from 
the party (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Depauw & Martin, 2009). At the party level, the models 
control for party size (% of seats), period in government and party family.  Party families may 
develop specific intra-party democratic models that reflect their core ideology and origins (Close 
2016; Gauja 2013; Poguntke et al. 2016). Previous analyses have included a contextual variable 
grasping the current (at the time of the survey) position of the party in government or in 
opposition. Being in government might increase the pressure put on MPs to reach unity (Carey 
2007; Stecker 2013); but at the same time might increase the risk of disagreement, as being in a 
governing coalition can lead parties to adopt positions that contradict the original party 
manifesto. However, preliminary analyses did not find any significant effect, neither on 
agreement nor on loyalty.  
 
Data and method 
To test these hypotheses, we combine two cross-country datasets. First, the PartiRep 
Comparative MP Survey database comprises an attitudinal survey carried out among national 
and regional legislators in 15 European democracies and other macro-level and meso-level 
variables (mostly linked to the state structure, electoral system, legislative organization and 
activity, etc.). MPs were invited to respond either through an online web-survey (46.8%), print 
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questionnaires (33.7%), face-to-face interviews (18.7%) or by telephone (0.8%). The data was 
collected between spring 2009 and winter 2012, with an average response rate of 19.5%, 
although this rate varies quite a lot from one parliament to another. Despite these varying 
response rates, the sample remains representative of the population (Deschouwer et al. 2014)1. 
Our study includes only the MPs elected in national parliaments. For the purpose of the 
analysis, we excluded respondents who sit as independent in the parliament. We also removed 
the parties which included less than six respondents in order to allow for enough intra-party 
variation in the responses provided by each party’s MPs. The final database includes 796 
individuals from 45 parties elected in 14 national assemblies (lower chamber). Second, the 
Political Party Database (PPDB) is used to measure intra-party democracy. The PPDB project is a 
cross-national project examining various aspects of intra-party structure and practices: party 
membership, selection of party personnel, leadership autonomy, links with collateral 
organization etc. The project focuses mostly on party official statutes and rules, and less on 
informal processes, what facilitates data collection, replication and cross-national comparison. 
The first round of data collection includes information (over 300 variables) on 122 parties in 19 
countries during the 2010-2014 period (Poguntke et al. 2016). The selected parties are mostly 
those elected in the lower house of the national parliaments.  
The analysis tests the hypotheses at the individual level through logistic regression 
models, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables (see below). The models 
control for the effect of oft-cited factors of parliamentary party unity, and given the hierarchical 
                                                 
1 Using the Duncan index of dissimilarity, Deschouwer et al. (2014) have noticed that, as far as party composition is 
concerned,  some parties are slightly underrepresented, while others are slightly overrepresented. The models 
presented in the analysis have been replicated by applying a party weight. The findings were highly similar. 
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structure of the data (MPs in parties, parties in countries), multilevel modelling is applied. 
Multilevel regression fits particularly well our theoretical framework and the nested structure of 
our data. We use ‘random intercept models’ that allow to capture systematic between-party 
and between-country differences, while other effects are assumed to be constant (Stegmueller 
2013)2. 
 
Variable operationalization 
For party agreement (DV1), we use a Likert type question that measures the MPs’ self-reported 
frequency of disagreement with their party.3 This variable has been dichotomized (whether the 
MP disagrees more often = ‘about once a month’ or ‘about every three months’ or whether the 
MP does it less frequently = ‘about once a year’ or ‘(almost) never’) to maximize comparability 
across parties from different countries given the unequal frequency of sessions across 
parliaments. This would also facilitate comparisons with the second dependent variable, party 
loyalty, which is dichotomous. Amongst the 796 parliamentarians, data is missing on that 
variable for 14 individuals. Amongst the remaining 782 individuals, 61.5% ‘rarely disagree’4 (1= 
agreement), while 38.5 % ‘often disagree’5 (0= disagreement). For party loyalty (DV2) a 
question6 enables to grasp the extent to which the MPs consider that they should remain loyal 
to their party (i.e. MP should vote according to his/her party’s opinion, coded as 1) or not (MP 
                                                 
2 These models do not assume changes in the slope of the pooled regression but only varying intercept according to 
the clustering variables. 
3 ‘How often, in the past year, would you say you have found yourself in the position that your party had one 
opinion on a vote in Parliament, and you personally had a different position?’ 
4 27.2% of the MPs said they (almost) never disagreed, 33.2% said they disagreed about once a year. 
5 10.1% of the MPs said they disagreed about once a month, 29.5% said they disagreed about once every three 
months. 
6 ‘And how should, in your opinion, a Member of Parliament vote in the situation that his/her party has one opinion 
on a vote in Parliament, and he/she personally has another?’.  
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should vote according to his/her own opinion, coded a 0), in case of a disagreement with their 
party. Data is missing for 51 MPs (6.5%), with missing values equally distributed across the 
sample.  Among the remaining MPs, 60% say they would follow the party line (loyalty), while 
40% consider they should follow their own opinion. While agreement and loyalty correlate 
weakly (coefficient value 0.11, significant at 0.01 level), the two are separate dimensions of 
party unity: ideological and social-psychological. The analysis reveals the extent to which intra-
party democracy affects distinctly these two dimensions. 
To measure IPD we rely on a simplified version of Poguntke et al.’s (2016, p. 17) 
‘assembly-based IPD’ index, which ‘measures the inclusiveness of party decision-making based 
on discussions within party bodies and assemblies, including assemblies of all members’.  From 
that index we use data only on personnel selection and organizational structure. This is mainly 
due to data availability: data regarding who has a formal input and a final say in the writing of 
the manifesto is missing for 12 of the 45 parties included in our dataset. We also simplify the 
measurement for each component, by including fewer variables. These simplified 
measurements correlate much with the more complex ones computed by Poguntke et al. 
(correlation coefficients varying between 0.90 and 0.95). 
We operationalize our IPD index, on the basis of the two components ‘selection of party 
personnel’ and ‘organizational structure’. Similarly to Poguntke et al. (2016), we have coded 
variable items ‘as 0.00 or 0.25 if they indicate that a given party has no or a modest level of 
inclusiveness on this specific aspect of IPD’ (Poguntke et al. 2016) (e.g. the final decision for 
selecting candidates rests in the hands of the party leader or national executive body); 0.50 for a 
medium level of inclusiveness (e.g. the PPG having the last word), and 0.75 and 1.00 for high 
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levels of inclusiveness (e.g. delegates at Congress or all party members). The final IPD index is 
normally distributed, while the IPD personnel and structure significantly correlate (Pearson 
coefficient = 0.39, significant at the 0.01 level). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
Regarding the control variables, seniority is measured as the number of years since the MP’s 
first election to the national parliament. Ideological distance is measure as the absolute 
difference between the MP’s placement on a 0-10 left-right scale and the position s/he 
attributes to her/his party. For the way legislators got elected, party-centred is used as the 
reference category, as it is the most frequent category. Time in government is measured as the 
percentage of time a party has been part of the national government between 1975 and 20127. 
Party families were classified in two steps. First, the PartiRep team coded party family on the 
basis of country experts’ judgment. Second, we slightly modified this classification on the basis 
of the literature on party families, which discusses their existence and coherence along three 
criteria: origin, ideology and (to a lesser extent) transnational federations (Mair & Mudde 1998). 
Seven party families are identified (see the list of parties in Supplementary table S1): radical left 
(3 parties), green (2), social-democrats (14), liberals (9), Christian-democrats (7), conservatives 
(12) and radical right (3). Social-democratic parties are used as the reference category, given 
that it is the most frequent category in the dataset. 
 
                                                 
7 Due to the important changes that occurred in the Italian party system in 1993, time in government of Italian 
parties is computed for the period 1993-2012. Time in government for the Belgian parties is computed after the 
split of each of the parties along the linguistic divide (1975). 
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Analysis and findings 
We present below the hierarchical logistic regression models examining the effect of IPD on 
legislators’ self-reported agreement and loyalty. Four models are estimated for each dimension. 
Models 1 and 5 include IPD as the sole predictor, models 2 and 6 add individual and party-level 
controls8 except for the way legislators got elected, which is included in models 3 and 7, and 
party family, which is added in models 4 and 8.9   
Models 1 and 2 reveal a negative and significant effect of IPD on MPs’ likelihood to 
report agreement with their party: legislators belonging to more internally democratic parties 
are more likely to express their disagreement (H1 confirmed). This higher frequency of 
disagreement can result from the fact that more democratic candidate selection procedures 
increase the risk of conflict between legislators’ principals, which might have diverging 
preferences. It can also stem from the fact that a greater degree of IPD in intra-party decision-
making processes in general creates an environment in which the expression of diverging 
opinions is more welcome. In that vein, Cordero and Coller’s (2014) study of Spanish 
parliamentary parties shows that MPs who perceive their selection to be inclusive and 
decentralized tend to perceive that the building of intra-party position (before the floor is taken) 
consists in a deliberative process, whereas those who perceive their selection to be centralized 
and exclusive also perceive that decisions are imposed through a top-down, disciplinary process. 
                                                 
8 A previous version of the paper controlled for the impact of country-level factors (e.g. multilevel or unitary 
structure of the state), but these were not relevant and did not alter the results. 
9 To ease the interpretation of parameter estimates, most independent variables were centralized around their 
mean as recommended by Enders & Tofighi (2007). Categorical variables such as sex, electoral system or party 
family were not centralized. IPD was not centralized as it is a composite index with a meaningful value of 0 across 
levels. 
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In a way, we could say that inclusiveness and decentralization produce a greater ‘democratic’ 
culture within the party, in which voice (Hirschman 1970) is more acceptable.  
The effect of the electoral system further suggests the importance of ‘localism’ 
incentivized by IPD (see above) in shaping legislators’ attitudes in parliament: legislators elected 
in single-member constituencies, and who thus have strong incentives to cultivate a local 
reputation  (Pilet et al., 2012), are less likely to report agreement than those elected in closed-
list systems (although the relationship does not reach the significance level). Note that once 
electoral rules are introduced, the effect of IPD loses strength and statistical significance (model 
3). The strength of the IPD effect further decreases when party family is introduced (model 4). 
Legislators from left-wing party families –and significantly, green parties– are more likely to 
report frequent disagreement. Interestingly, these families tend to adopt more democratic 
intra-party decision-making processes (which explains the lower value of the IPD coefficient in 
model 4), and as such, produce more favourable space for expressing disagreement.  
For loyalty, the sign of the coefficient goes in the direction expected by H2:  MPs in more 
internally democratic parties are less likely to report loyal attitudes (models 5 to 7). However, by 
contrast to agreement, the relationship does not reach the significance level. Besides, once 
party family is introduced (model 8), the sign of the coefficient becomes positive. The 
relationship between IPD and legislators’ loyalty therefore appears less robust. Nevertheless, 
the effect of party family suggests an interesting complementary explanation of the impact of 
intra-party factors on legislators’ attitudes towards party unity –but not exactly in the way 
intended by the usual rational-choice approach and principal-agent framework. Party families 
adopt specific intra-party democratic models that reflect their core values, and in turn both 
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these organizational settings and values may affect the way legislators conceive their role and 
relate to their party (Close 2016). Model 8 indicates that green legislators are significantly less 
likely to report loyalty –in a way, they feel more free to state their independence towards their 
party–, while legislators from radical right parties, which have lower levels of IPD, appear as the 
most likely to report loyalty. As suggested by Volpi in this volume, a GAL-TAN value effect could 
also be at play here, with GAL values (promoting individual freedom, self-fulfilment and self-
affirmation, embodied in green and liberal parties for instance) encouraging the expression of 
individualities within the party. 
In order to ease the interpretation of the effect of IPD, figures 1 and 2 plot its marginal 
effect respectively on legislators’ probability to report agreement and loyalty (based on models 
3 and 7). The slope of this relationship is clearly steeper in the case of agreement, and the 
confidence interval is narrower. Legislators in parties with an average IPD of 0.25 have a 
probability of 0.70 to report agreement, while legislators in parties with an average IPD of 0.75 
have a probability of 0.57 to report agreement, thus, a difference of 0.13; whereas this 
difference is only of 0.07 for loyalty (from 0.64 to 0.57). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Concerning the model fit, the standard yardstick for multilevel models consists in comparing the 
likelihood of the different estimated models. The lower the Log-likelihood, the better the model 
fit. Obviously, this also depends on the number of observations. As these multilevel models are 
logistic models, we have also computed Tjur’s coefficient of discrimination D10 to quantify the 
                                                 
10 This coefficient fulfils a similar function as R-square in ordinary least square regression 
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predictive ability of each regression (Tjur, 2009) 11. For both dimensions of party unity, the 
models including solely IPD in the list of predictors have a quite low goodness of fit, suggesting 
that other variables matter in predicting legislators’ agreement and loyalty. Indeed, introducing 
the control variables improve (although modestly) the explanatory power of the models. The 
results confirm the effect of oft-cited factors of party unity. As far as agreement is concerned, in 
line with Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou (this special section), gender matters: women appear 
less prone to voice their disagreement than men. Unsurprisingly, legislators’ perceived left-right 
distance towards their party increases their propensity to report disagreement. As far as loyalty 
is concerned, older MPs appear less likely to report loyalty than younger MPs (models 6, 7 and 
8), and legislators from larger parties tend to report more loyal attitudes (models 6 and 7). 
 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
Conclusion 
Existing research has often suggested that greater IPD would decrease parliamentary party 
unity, but they have been plagued with several limitations. At the empirical level, most studies 
have exclusively conceived IPD through the degree of inclusiveness or decentralization of 
candidate selection rules. Besides, party unity has overwhelmingly been measured through 
voting behavioural data, and to a lesser extent attitudes towards representation have been 
considered. These limitations imply that we still have a limited understanding of the relationship 
between a party’s degree of IPD and the various dimensions of parliamentary party unity. 
                                                 
11 AIC and BIC provide a similar information as the log-likelihood but these measures are based ‘on the likelihood of 
the data given a fitted model (the ‘likelihood’) penalized by the number of estimated parameters of the model’ 
(Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013, p. 134). 
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This research has attempted to address these issues. First, we have used a 
comprehensive index of IPD, taking into account both intra-party personnel selection rules and 
organizational structure. This has allowed grasping the general degree of inclusiveness of intra-
party processes. Second, we have examined two pre-floor attitudinal dimensions of unity: 
legislators’ self-reported frequency of agreement, and their reported loyalty in case of 
disagreement between their opinion and the position of their party on a specific policy. This has 
helped measuring legislative unity net of disciplinary effect, and permitted to get deeper into 
the ‘black box’ of parliamentary parties.  
Our findings tend to confirm the widespread assumption that a greater IPD would 
produce greater legislative disunity, but in attitudinal rather than in behavioural terms. 
Depending on the degree of inclusiveness of intra-party processes, measured through our index 
but also grasped through party family, legislators seem more or less willing to report frequent 
disagreement with their party, and to assert their own opinion in the face of their party. The 
greater the internal democratic ‘culture’, the more likely legislators will report frequent 
disagreement and individualistic attitudes.  
However, we must admit that the effects uncovered lack a bit of robustness, especially 
that between IPD and loyalty. Other limitations pertain to the design and implementation of this 
type of elite survey (e.g. selection biases, varying response rates, limited N etc.). Nevertheless, 
we think this research contributes well to the discussion on the determinants of parliamentary 
party unity, by providing a new investigation into the relationship between IPD and legislative 
unity, and by proposing a more sociological understanding of the relationship between intra-
party organization and the processes of party unity.  
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities: Marginal effect of IPD on legislators’ reported agreement (model 3).  
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities: Marginal effect of IPD on legislators’ reported loyalty (model 7). 
 
Table 1. Composition of IPD index. 
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Personnel selection inclusiveness 
index12 
Organizational structure inclusiveness index 
IP
D
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b
le
s 
Who has the final vote in the party 
leader selection process? 
Who is eligible to vote at the party congress? 
Who has the final vote in the 
candidate selection process 
How frequently must a party congress be held?13 
 Number of layers between the party congress and the highest 
executive body14 
 Number of members with voting rights in the party highest 
executive body15 
Sc
o
re
 
co
m
p
o
n
en
t Arithmetic mean of leadership and 
candidate selection variables 
Arithmetic mean of organizational structure variables 
IPD index= Arithmetic mean of the components  ‘ Personnel-selection’ and ‘Organizational stucture’ 
 
 
Table 2. The effect of intra-party democracy on legislative agreement and loyalty– Multilevel models 
 
 Agreement  Loyalty 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Part         
IPD -1.116* -1.058* -0.721 -0.575 -0.886 -0.585 -0.499 0.452 
 
(0.585) (0.592) (0.600) (0.625) (0.943) (0.973) (1.006) (0.988) 
Age 
 
0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
-0.019* -0.020** -0.020** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Sex 
 
0.521*** 0.509*** 0.593*** 
 
0.089 0.075 0.093 
                                                 
12 Data is missing for one party: the Polish Law & Justice party. For that party, the general IPD index is computed 
solely on the basis of IPD_structure. 
13 Coding: More often than once per year=1.00, Once per year= 0.75; Between 1 to 3 years=0.50; Every 3 
years=0.25; Every 4-5 years= 0.00. 
14 Coding : 1=1.00 ; 2= 0.50 ; 3=0.00 
15 Coding : Less than 10= 0.00 ; Between 10 and 19=0.25 ; Between 20 and 39=0.50 ; Between 40 and 59=0.75, 
More than 60= 1.00 
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(0.183) (0.186) (0.188) 
 
(0.198) (0.199) (0.200) 
Seniority 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
0.002 0.002 0.001 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
LR Distance 
 
-0.325*** -0.328*** -0.330*** 
 
-0.090 -0.093 -0.098 
  
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089) 
Party Size 
 
0.011 0.014 0.001 
 
0.027* 0.029* 0.017 
  
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) 
Time in Government 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.007 
 
0.004 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Intermediate electoral system 
 
 -0.209 -0.298 
 
 -0.236 -0.368 
  
 (0.221) (0.231) 
 
 (0.320) (0.308) 
Candidate-centred electoral system 
 
 0.591 0.398 
 
 0.123 0.290 
  
 (0.397) (0.429) 
 
 (0.791) (0.725) 
Radical left 
 
 
 
-0.450 
 
 
 
-0.530 
  
 
 
(0.446) 
 
 
 
(0.601) 
Green 
 
 
 
-1.388** 
 
 
 
-1.840** 
  
 
 
(0.539) 
 
 
 
(0.776) 
Liberal 
 
 
 
0.122 
 
 
 
-0.445 
  
 
 
(0.315) 
 
 
 
(0.378) 
Christian-democrats 
 
 
 
0.403 
 
 
 
0.127 
  
 
 
(0.289) 
 
 
 
(0.369) 
Conservatives 
 
 
 
0.167 
 
 
 
-0.252 
  
 
 
(0.228) 
 
 
 
(0.277) 
Radical right 
 
 
 
0.309 
 
 
 
1.158 
  
 
 
(0.587) 
 
 
 
(0.765) 
Constant 1.106*** 0.941*** 0.741* 0.601 0.957 0.727 0.718 0.295 
 
(0.358) (0.358) (0.379) (0.415) (0.593) (0.610) (0.662) (0.665) 
Random Part         
τ00, Party 0.033 0.091 0.112 0.000 0.249 0.214 0.229 0.07 
τ00, Country 0.109 0.050 0.012 0.077 0.683 0.791 0.705 0.569 
Observations 781 722 722 722 739 739 689 689 
N Party 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
N Country 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Tjur's D 0.042 .071 0.074 0.076 0.143 0.172 0.172 0.172 
Log Likelihood -514.355 -465.630 -463.913 -459.082 -466.164 -426.436 -426.141 -420.081 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,036.710 951.259 951.826 954.164 940.329 872.872 876.283 876.162 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,055.353 997.080 1,006.811 1,036.641 958.750 918.224 930.706 957.796 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Supplementary Table S1: List of parties included in the analysis 
Country (& year of election) Parties Party family IPD 
Austria (2008) FPÖ RR .25 
 Grüne GRE .54 
 ÖVP CHD .33 
 SPÖ SD .29 
Belgium (2007) CDH CHD .72 
 CD&V CHD .81 
 MR LIB .50 
 Open VLD LIB .91 
 PS SD .72 
 SP.A SD .67 
 Vlaams Belang RR .13 
France (2007) PS SD .38 
 UMP CON .34 
Germany (2009) CDU CHD .66 
 CSU CHD .67 
 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen GRE .66 
 Die Linke RL .69 
 FDP LIB .69 
 SPD SD .59 
Hungary (2006) Fidesz CON .50 
 MSZP SD .66 
Ireland (2007) Fianna Fáil CON .54 
 Fine Gael CON .50 
 Labour SD .72 
Israel (2009) Kadima LIB .75 
Italy (2008) Partito Democratico SD .88 
 Popolo della Libertà CON .81 
Netherlands (2006) CDA CHD .78 
 PvdA SD .84 
 SP RL .63 
 VVD LIB .47 
Norway (2005) Arbeiderpartiet SD .52 
 Fremskrittpartiet RR .59 
 Høyre CON .56 
 Socialistisk Venstreparti RL .59 
Poland (2007) PiS CON  .25 
 PO CON .13 
Portugal (2009) CDS/PP CON .53 
 PSD LIB .53 
 PS SD .53 
Spain (2008) PP CON .47 
 PSOE SD .44 
United Kingdom (2010) Conservative Party CON .72 
 Labour Party SD .78 
 Liberal Democrats LIB .88 
 
